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NATO AND THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST
A MISSION TO RENEW NATO?
SUMMARY
The key challenge for NATO in the 1990s was whether to accept the call for “out of area” 
missions. Since Bosnia and Kosovo this has been no longer a question. After 9/11/2001, the main 
question remains whether - in the context of fighting international terrorism - NATO should “go 
global”, and if so, what should be the rationale, the scope and the goal of such a mission.
The purpose of this paper is to argue that there exist powerful rational arguments for a mission of 
NATO in the Greater Middle East1. At the very least, the idea deserves an honest and thorough 
discussion among the Allies. 
The main rationale for NATO’s engagement in the Greater Middle East lies in the very nature of 
threats emanating from the region – terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), poor or irresponsible governance (failed or rogue states), often with virulent anti-
American and anti-western rhetoric as the sole coherent policy, as well as local conflicts with 
global repercussions. Allies should take up the gauntlet and make an effort to design not only a 
common strategy but also to agree on joint measures within NATO itself. A failure of the U.S. 
and Europe to face up to these challenges would be detrimental to security on both sides of the 
Atlantic.  
The following seem to be the possible scenarios and their consequences:
1. Both for the U.S and the EU, it is a policy option to bypass NATO2 in pursuing their 
security goals. However, it would be equal to giving up on the political potential of the 
Alliance. Therefore it is the least desired option, especially for new NATO members since 
it would devaluate their hard won membership, and consequently relegate NATO into 
oblivion.
2. To turn NATO into a common toolbox3 that is to be used either by the U.S. – in building 
coalitions of the willing - or by the EU - in providing muscles for CESDP ambitions –
seems to be a tempting "middle-of-the-way“ option for some. However it would put a 
constant pressure on NATO’s cohesion4. Sooner rather than later, we might find that 
many of the tools in the box are broken, or even worse, that the toolbox is empty.
3. If enough political will is present, NATO could serve as a proven framework for building 
a coherent strategy and providing joint or at least common capabilities. In this case, 
NATO would maintain an independent ability to project power in order to protect the 
interests of its members in NATO-led “out of area” operations. We tend to view this 
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option as an imperative task for the Alliance. However, we could be risking possible 
overstretch5.
At this moment, there prevail obviously different policy approaches on the two sides of the 
Atlantic: the U.S. tends to rely on ad-hoc coalitions (or multilateralism à la carte) rather than on 
the Alliance, whereas some Europeans view this as unbounded U.S. unilateralism that should be 
countered. It is NATO that can bridge this potential trans-Atlantic rift – the U.S. should perceive 
NATO as a formalized ‘coalition of the willing’ and Europeans should use NATO as a primary 
multilateral venue for cooperation with the U.S. It seems to be clear that using NATO is 
advantageous both for the U.S.6 and European7 NATO members.
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INTRODUCTION – NATO AFTER IRAQ
The fact that the Iraqi operation was conducted by a ‘coalition of the willing’, outside of NATO 
structures, is often interpreted as a failure of NATO8. Others, e.g. Richard Lugar, vehemently 
oppose this view.9
NATO Secretary General Robertson has recently addressed the key question10 – why should 
NATO be involved in stabilizing Iraq? Other analysts11 have concluded that Iraq created another 
political challenge for NATO members. As a matter of fact, difficulties in post-war management 
in Iraq have led the U.S. to seek broader support materialized in military contributions12 and 
providing greater political legitimacy13.  In principle, few U.S. policy-makers would like to see 
the U.S. as a lonely global policeman14 supported by various ad-hoc coalitions.
So far, the role of NATO in Iraq has been limited15. NATO’s involvement in postwar Iraq 
extends only to provide logistical support to the Polish-led division of the multinational 
stabilization force. Nevertheless, NATO has been always dealing with current principal threats, 
as has been recently manifested in its takeover of peace operations in Afghanistan. It is no 
wonder that a discussion about the future of NATO’s role in Iraq and the Greater Middle East is 
looming16.
NATO IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST – KEY QUESTIONS
This paper addresses the topic from the following angles: the nature of new security threats, 
NATO’s capacity to cope with them, the “out of area” concept and its geographical and resource 
limitations, the possible role for NATO in Iraq or in the Middle East peace process based on 
NATO’s niche capabilities, potential political implications of NATO’s Middle Eastern 
engagement, and, finally, the possible “democratizing” effect of NATO’s involvement.
1. TERRITORIAL CORRELATIONS / CONTEXT OF NEW SECURITY THREATS –
TERRORISM, PROLIFERATION, FAILED AND ROGUE STATES
The end of the Cold War changed the very substance of European security. Territorial defense 
against a massive military conflagration in Europe ceased to be the main concern of the Alliance. 
Wars in the Balkans and accelerated trends toward autonomous European security capabilities 
forced a drastic change in the security policies of NATO. 
After Kosovo new threats emerged into prominence. Terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and means of their delivery, concern about failed or rogue states (non-cooperating 
states or states of concern, non-state actors, etc.) – these threats seem to dominate any post 9/11 
analysis of the international security environment. As a consequence, the geopolitical focus 
moved beyond Europe17, or at least to its periphery. The emphasis has shifted from Article V of 
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the Washington Treaty towards dealing with non-traditional threats18. Inevitably, this has raised 
concerns of some NATO members – both old19 and new – fearing that the exclusive club is 
losing its prestige by diluting its commitments20.
The Greater Middle East21 (GME) seems to be a conundrum of the above-mentioned threats in 
the potentially most explosive combination22. Moreover, GME is the region where both America 
and Europe share fundamental interests23, although – due to various differences - they do not 
necessarily agree on the policies to pursue these interests. However, there is a powerful incentive 
to come to an agreement since “neither the U.S. nor Europe can fix the Greater Middle East by 
itself”.24 In any case, “NATO’s ability to deal with new threats faces an early test in the Middle 
East”. 25
2. HOW CAN NATO REACT? WHAT CAN THE ENLARGED NATO OFFER IN 
DEALING WITH NEW SECURITY THREATS?
The concept of collective defense (Art. V) has not outlived its relevance. Solidarity among liberal 
democratic states in defending common values and interests remains vital for the future of 
democracy. NATO has to maintain its core functions even as it is advancing new ones26. The 
nature of the new threats deserves an appropriate response: “To combat transnational terrorist 
networks effectively, NATO should more closely resemble a network itself.”27
The conceptual answer to the new challenges is territorial enlargement, although that has been 
motivated also by other factors, and functional extension28 or expansion29. Any future 
enlargement of NATO remains geographically confined to the Euro-Atlantic area. However, if 
NATO is to assume a global role, it cannot do so without closely cooperating with non-European 
allies (e.g. Australia). In principle, NATO should keep the door open to all eligible allies30 (e.g. 
Israel). Any functional expansion requires intra-alliance consensus – the current position of 
NATO is reflected in the Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington summit in April 1999.
2.1 THE SHIFT FROM MILITARY TO NON-MILITARY ROLES (‘NATION BUILDING’)
The new security environment is often characterized by the growing relevance of non-military31
and non-state factors.  Some analysts argue that NATO and EU should divide labor as if the non-
military tasks were solely EU business32, whereas others think that NATO is also capable of 
nation building tasks33. NATO’s contribution to the democratic transformation in Central and 
Eastern Europe as well as to similar transitions in some of the older member states - e.g. in 
cultivating civilian control of armed forces – cannot be denied. This might be of utmost 
importance in societies where the military serves as a backbone.
The question arises whether EU is better equipped for the so-called soft security tasks or whether 
it is simply making a virtue of its inability to deal with the hard ones.  It is unclear why European 
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NATO members should be ready to offer more capabilities under the EU flag than they are 
offering as a part of the Alliance. 
In this context, it is important to argue that NATO rather than the U.S. – EU format should 
remain the main framework of transatlantic security cooperation. It is obvious that NATO 
provided the necessary political element in containing the Soviet military threat. Coping with the 
current threats again requires the kind of political legitimacy that can best be secured through 
NATO.
On a deeper level, it could be argued that NATO - as the traditional repository and defender of 
“western” values: liberal democracy, free market, rule of law - should be the appropriate vehicle 
for responding to the new non-traditional threats since they seem to be targeted against this very 
body of values rather than against any single country, specific territory or specific policy.
3. IS NATO’S “OUT OF AREA” CONCEPT APPLICABLE IN THE GREATER MIDDLE 
EAST?
The main question considered during the 90s was whether NATO had to expand and accept new 
missions beyond defending its own territory.  As Richard Lugar argued in the early 1990s 
“NATO has to go out of area, or out of business.” However, NATO strategic and conceptual 
documents (Rome Declaration of 1991 or Madrid Declaration of 1997) kept referring to 
European or trans-Atlantic security. The Strategic Concept adopted at the Washington summit in 
April 1999 reflected the growing awareness of the changed global security environment.34
Terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 showed how urgent the question about the place of NATO in the 
global security system really was. 
3.1 SHOULD NATO ‘GO GLOBAL’?
No consensus on this question has been achieved35. The debate about the global role for NATO 
has on the one hand revealed a growing awareness of global challenges,36 inhibited on the other 
hand by fears of overextending NATO’s obligations37. Talbott38 and Kugler39 tried to formulate a 
balanced view by rejecting global ambitions of NATO.  In recent years, opinions among NATO 
members have shifted significantly: even NATO’s Secretary General suggested that the once 
unthinkable is no longer taboo40.  After 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq, one may witness a new 
dynamism of this debate and some go even further by calling unreservedly for a global NATO41.  
3.2 THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AS A KEY GLOBAL CHALLENGE?
As we mentioned earlier, the Greater Middle East is the most prominent source of mutually 
correlated threats at the intersection of vital interests. Not incidentally, the region is denoted as 
the Rubik Cube42.  Emerson & Tocci identified four main interrelated crises in the GME – the 
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Israeli-Palestinian conflict, threats of Al-Qaeda, the crisis over Iraq and the overall development 
of the region, or rather the lack thereof. However, due to their preferences for the UN, the US and 
the EU engagement, the authors have assumed only a minor role for NATO in the region. Others 
suggest that any engagement of former European colonial powers in the region may raise old 
fears and resentments43.
3.2.1 NATO AND ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been traditionally viewed as the very source of Middle 
Eastern instability. In the past, one might come to the conclusion that without solving this 
conflict one cannot envisage stability in the Middle East. At the same time, before the occupation 
of Iraq one could not realistically expect a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (many 
Israelis still think that that conflict management is the best possible outcome). Rolling back Iraq 
changed the strategic map of the whole Middle East and paved the way for the Road Map – a 
new attempt to move the Israeli-Palestinian track forward. In fact, the Pandora box of GME has 
been opened in a different way than expected. 
The truth is that without international engagement the Israeli-Palestinian relations are likely to 
deteriorate even further44. The idea of international monitoring of an Israeli-Palestinian 
settlement is supported from various policy perspectives:
- NATO peacekeeping role after the settlement45
- UN or NATO presence as crisis management46
- U.S.-led trusteeship47
Any international presence would be highly sensitive for Israel and it is perceived with caution in 
Washington, too. On the other hand, Palestinians consistently call for international involvement 
as a counterweight to Israel. So far, Europeans have preferred to be involved as the EU in the 
Quartet format (US, EU, Russia, UN) rather than going through NATO.  However, one cannot 
exclude the possibility that at a certain stage of future settlement NATO – alone or in concert 
with others - might contribute politically rather than militarily on the ground. 
There is also a defensive rationale for channeling any western involvement in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict through NATO. A dual-track (US, EU) or a multiple-track (US, EU, UN, and 
Russia) approach might in the course of time transform the so far differing perspectives into 
conflicting ones, with disastrous consequences both for the Atlantic cohesion and for the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict itself.
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3.2.2 NATO AND THE GULF – IRAQ
The Persian Gulf is of primary concern to NATO allies because of two reasons: proliferation of 
WMD and securing energy supplies48. It seems that Americans are more aware of the 
coincidence of NATO member countries  ´ interests in the Gulf and see more European 
engagement as desirable49.  It is the European reluctance that stands in the way of more allied 
cooperation in the Gulf50. As was shown in the Iraqi case, some Europeans do not subscribe to 
the U.S. policies in the Gulf.  Nevertheless, in the current circumstances the way for NATO to 
the Gulf leads through Iraq51. 
4. POTENTIAL ROLE FOR NATO AND ITS TOOLS
The key question is whether there are any niche capabilities that neither the EU nor the US alone 
can provide. What may be the unique contributions of NATO in the GME? Are they primarily in 
the military or in the political areas52? 
NATO can provide political legitimacy to stabilization and democratization in the GME. 
Nevertheless, there will be always a tendency toward using selective formats (e.g. Quartet, 
Contact Group, etc).
There is the remarkable military record of NATO in planning and running peacekeeping 
operations including post-conflict stabilization and reforming security structures53. Suggestions 
have been made to use this expertise in the GME54. 
It is a matter of further discussion whether NATO is capable of providing assistance in nation 
building and promotion of democracy. Here again, Iraq is a test case.
In 1990s NATO has developed a spectrum of tools to deal with the external challenges it has 
faced: enlarged cooperation forums (NACC, EAPC), NATO+1 dialogue (NRC, NUC, 
Mediterranean dialogue), partnership programs (PfP) and even procedures for future membership 
(MAP).  Patterns of dialogue and cooperation, of sharing best practices and standards, and of 
providing assistance are firmly rooted in the NATO culture. Possible ways of using some of the 
existing models in the GME region should be considered.  NATO should offer a modified PfP 
program to some of the countries in the region. Whether this may include even a long-term 
perspective of membership remains to be discussed. The weak point in applying the above-
mentioned formats - which were designed for Europe – in the GME is the following: what kind 
of sufficient incentives – apart from the membership perspective – can NATO offer in reforming 
the security system in the GME? Security consultations or partnerships not involving full 
membership do not seem sufficient, especially for some of the smaller democratic or 
democratizing countries of the region. The problem is that the “added value” of a NATO security 
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involvement as opposed to a US security guarantee is at the moment not very high. That, 
however, can and should change in the course of time.
5. IMPLICATIONS OF POSSIBLE NATO ENGAGEMENT IN THE GME (IRAQ, 
PALESTINE) – CEMENTING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS OR DESTROYING 
NATO’S COHESION? 
NATO could obviously neglect global aspirations in its further development. The consequence 
would be the loss of global significance55. All depends on policies of member states. The most 
poignant expression of this fact comes from the U.S.56 If NATO takes up global challenges –
initially in the GME region – it would be a serious test of its interoperability and cohesion. It 
would have inevitable implications for planning57 and decision-making procedures58 within the 
Alliance, which present some member states with an undoubtedly sensitive dilemma. 
Authorization of planning procedures and weakening of the principle of unanimity are definitely 
explosive subjects for political discussions within NATO.  However, the alternatives seem to be 
even worse. The risk of bypassing or marginalizing NATO is evident. Deepening of the Atlantic 
rift over NATO would be detrimental to both its shores. There is a way out - the U.S. should 
perceive NATO as a formalized ‘coalition of the willing’ and Europeans should use NATO as a 
primary multilateral venue for cooperation with the U.S. Thus NATO will be able to deal with 
the most urgent current crises starting with the Greater Middle East.
To search for a global role for NATO just so that it has some kind of a role would be both wrong 
and destined to fail. A freedom-loving alliance, just like a freedom-loving country, should not 
seek adventures abroad, “in search of monsters to slay”59. However, in the case of GME, the 
monsters are already very much there. To address their threats is thus not a question of expanding 
or transforming NATO’s mission but rather a question of the continued vitality of its original 
mission and purpose.
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